The Mission tells a story from several levels which are often neglected. The author deployed to many of the places where American soldiers are involved in making foreign policy. She talked with these soldiers, their commanders, and the civilians they interact with in those places. From that vantage-point, Ms. Priest offers some salient arguments about the wisdom of using American soldiers as the vanguard of American diplomacy.
I'm not sure I agree with Ms. Priest's penultimate argument -- that America's military is best kept for warfighting and not peacemaking. Since the Bosnia mission, I have echoed Gen. George Patton's sentiment that an ounce of sweat in peacetime was worth a gallon of blood in wartime. Better to experience some problems in these missions than to have to fight an all-out war in the Balkans or elsewhere. Nonetheless, Ms. Priest tells a compelling story. Her book stands as a piece of outstanding reporting, and I highly recommend it.
I feel the book gives more info on this subject than any - and it is a nice supplement to Priests fellow Washington Post writer Bob Woodwards "Bush at War".
Here is the meeting between CIA paramilitary teams and the first special forces A-teams are described in depth - and there even are several never before seen pictures of the teams on the ground doing their job. Also lots of info on the Delta and SEAL operators midset, training, and day to day activities. It nicely fills out the "Bush at War" account of CIA-operators with boxes full of cash bribing warlords to shortterm alliances - and also details how the different warlords used different special forces teams to wage war on each other.
The Prisoners-in-containers-masacre at Mazar-i-Sharif and the US involvment in that is only mentioned in a footnote.
If you want to know how things started out on the ground in Afganistan, how few soldiers where on the ground, and lots of other details then this is for you. Also several other special forces areas of operation (Nigeria, Bosnia, Latin America etc are mentioned)
The rest of the book is a nice insight in the sometimes strange combination of roles you get in distant parts of the world when US-soldiers act as representatives for the US - often filling the roles of police and diplomats, and the belief in washington that forces can solve most problems by training local armies.
I personally feel the definitive book on the 319 men on the ground in Afganistan and their activities the first few months after september 11 is not yet written - Mark Bowden author of Black Hawk Down should with his connections make this his next project!
Any effete, ignorant, intellectual snob who believes the officers and men and women of our military services are too dumb to walk and chew gum simultaneously needs to allow Dana Priest to disabuse such a deluded one from that error. From the interview I got a sense of character, commitment, and competency from this journalist and author. Within a few days C-SPAN will have the interview (video)and the transcript available free at www.....org. Also, after a few days, the audio will be available for a fee at www.....com.
One might conclude that Americans and America's political leaders have now decided that our warriors should handle both the pointy end of the spear and the dirty end of the stick. Is this what being the world's lone superpower is all about? I awaiting the S&H process and look forward with anticipation to reading Dana Priest's book!
1. The U.S. military has gradually squeezed out diplomatic efforts abroad. This has occurred because military funding has remained constant while funding for diplomatic agencies (State Dept, USAID, Commerce, etc) has declined. I agree with the author's argument here, and think this is a dangerous trend. We ought to be engaging foreign governments, economies, and societies -- not just their militaries.
2. In this vacuum, military commanders (the "CinCs") have initiated a number of "military diplomacy" programs. These include the use of Special Forces to train foreign soldiers, sharing of intelligence, promotion of foreign military sales, etc. In the absence of diplomatic workers from traditional agencies like State and USAID, these soldiers have become the biggest group of American government personnel operating abroad. I agree with the author here too; the soldiers have filled a diplomatic vacuum created by tremendous funding disparities. Ironically, this occurred even in the Clinton Administration, where human rights and international engagement had a kindred spirit in the White House.
3. Soldiers are ill-trained and ill-equipped to do this job on behalf of America. Using soldiers abroad has led to a number of breakdowns in American foreign policy, such as the failure to establish a lasting and self-sustaining peace in the Balkans. Moreover, soldiers have contributed to conflict and human-rights problems in various ways, especially through the training of foreign troops. Here, I strongly disagree with Ms. Priest. U.S. soldiers have left a powerful and lasting legacy in places like Bosnia. They may remain there for some time. But the mission is a success story. 10 years ago, snipers dueled over the streets of Sarajevo, killing civilians with impunity. Today, civilians can walk through Sarajevo without fear. A similar, if not-yet-perfect, situation exists in Kosovo, where U.S. soldiers secure the future of Serbs and Albanians alike.
Bottom Line: Soldiers don't make the best diplomats in the world. They should not replace political, social and economic diplomacy, as they have done because of funding disparities between the Pentagon and other federal agencies. But soldiers do a pretty good job at policing the peace. And while the American infantry isn't automatically ready to assume such missions, it can be trained to do so. With good training and leadership, American soldiers can make and keep peace in some of the world's worst places -- just as they have done in Bosnia and Kosovo. On occasion, mistakes will be made. However, American soldiers have proven their ability to stop the killing -- a goal that thousands of diplomats could never attain in the Balkans.