A good start for analytical jurisprudence, but no more

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	• The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law Series) H. L. A. Hart Oxford University Press, USA, 1997 - 328 pages average customer review:based on 5 reviews view larger image
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highly recommended

Obligatory reading.

One of the highest achievements in the history of jurisprudence. Simple to read, complex to thoroughly grasp, written in clear prose but full of ideas. Previous familiarity with Kelsen and Austin should prove helpful to extract the most out of this book. You can follow it by reading Dworkin and Bobbio (sadly unavailable in English - his Teoria della norma giuridica and Teoria dell'ordenamento giuridico are as obligatory as Kelsen and Hart).

Even though it is a work of legal positivism, it contains one of the best analyses of natural law and ethics I have ever read. This is, much more than the elements it's most famous for (the distinction between primary and secondary rules), what makes The Concept of Law shine.

The postscript, also sold separetely at Amazon, is included in this second edition of the book.

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a seminal text on legal philosophy and jurisprudence

One of the most important books written in the field of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. A must-read for anyone who wants to talk intelligently about the topic. Each of Dr. Hart's chapters has been the springboard for entire areas of discussion since its publication, such as law as a system of rules, the separation of law and morality, etc. After you finish this book, read Prof. Dworkin's critique in "The Model of Rules," 35 Univ.Chi.L.Rev. 14 (1967) (excerpted in "The Philosophy of Law") and Prof. Dworkin's "Taking Rights Seriously" to see how Hart's theories have affect jurisprudential scholarship since the publication of this text in 1961. Again, if one had to select the top thinkers in the field, it's Austin, Hart, and Dworkin.

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A good start for analytical jurisprudence, but no more

Hart takes apart the legal positivism of Austin and acknowledges some validity in natural law theory. But Hart fails to connect the "minimum content of natural law" with his analysis of a "rule of recongition" that allows a legal system to exist.

Hart's critique of Austin's legal positivism is right on and rightly consigns it to the dust bin as a way of explaining all manifestations of the phenomenon of law. Law as a threat backed up by force simply cannot explain contracts, wills, and trusts. The law doesn't just threaten people, it also empowers them. Positivism also fails to acknowledge the "internal" aspect of legal rules as well as failing to give an account of how law is recognized, clarified, and changed. Hart posits a "rule of recongition" to take care of this. Hart acknowledges a "minimum content of natural law" that explains the purpose of law as responding to certain human needs (bodily vulnerability, limited altruism, etc.). This gave rise to the revival of natural law theory in Anglophone jurisprudence in the 20th century. But Hart just kind of sticks the natural law chapter in his book without saying how it connects to the rest of what he says about legal rules and systems. Look at Finnis' Natural Law and Natural Rights for the "extension" of Hart's project.

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Law Students

A must-read for any and all law students (along with Dworkin's "Law's Empire"). Both are pre-eminent jurisprudence scholars of the 20th century.

Inadequacies of Hart's concept of a rule

Hart insists that there are many differen kinds of rules - he only 'elucidetes social rules' -but he also accepts that not all legal rules are social rules. What then are they? The foundation of his account of a social rule is an aspect of the form of life (vide Wittgenstein) underlying the use of language - but it is life without the multiplicity of activity at any one time and without conflict.

The Concept of Law is the most important and original work of legal philosophy written this century. First published in 1961, it is considered the masterpiece of H.L.A. Hart's enormous contribution to the study of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. Its elegant language and balanced arguments have sparked wide debate and unprecedented growth in the quantity and quality of scholarship in this area--much of it devoted to attacking or defending Hart's theories. Principal among Hart's critics is renowned lawyer and political philosopher Ronald Dworkin who in the 1970s and 80s mounted a series of challenges to Hart's Concept of Law. It seemed that Hart let these challenges go unanswered until, after his death in 1992, his answer to Dworkin's criticism was discovered among his papers.

In this valuable and long-awaited new edition Hart presents an Epilogue in which he answers Dworkin and some of his other most influential critics including Fuller and Finnis. Written with the same clarity and candor for which the first edition is famous, the Epilogue offers a sharper interpretation of Hart's own views, rebuffs the arguments of critics like Dworkin, and powerfully asserts that they have based their criticisms on a faulty understanding of Hart's work. Hart demonstrates that Dworkin's views are in fact strikingly similar to his own. In a final analysis, Hart's response leaves Dworkin's criticisms considerably weakened and his positions largely in question.

Containing Hart's final and powerful response to Dworkin in addition to the revised text of the original Concept of Law, this thought-provoking and persuasively argued volume is essential reading for lawyers and philosophers throughout the world.

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