Detailed story of the tragedy of post-war Iraq

books:

	• Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq Larry Diamond Holt Paperbacks, 2006 - 416 pages average customer review:based on 30 reviews view larger image
	for more information click here

highly recommended

Very Interesting

This is an interesting book. Anyone who is interested in an alternative to the right wing talk radio and tv news should seriously consider checking out the Thom Hartmann radio show opposite Rush Limbaugh weekdays at: thomhartmann dot com / showlisten.shtml

Whether democrat, republican, or indepedent, so many of the facts out there are completely ignored by the mainstream media and talk shows. This show is one strong example of an examination of the facts regardless of your political affiliation. I am not affiliated with the show in any way, just struck by the facts so many seem to ignore.

for more information click here

An Insider's Perspective on Iraq

Larry Diamond's Squandered Victory is interesting but also somewhat disappointing.

Diamond was among those Americans who went to Iraq after the invasion to try to support democratization. One of the sadder aspects of this book is the author's confidence that his forays into the Iraqi community to lead discussions on democracy had any chance of success. As one reads the volume, the optimism seems to have been misplaced (especially given our knowledge of what has happened over time) that it leads me to think of the author as somewhat naive (believing that meetings with small groups of Iraqis could make much of a difference, based on the larger context in Iraq; and I am familiar with and respect his other work on democracy).

Nonetheless, there are useful insights in this volume. On a number of occasions, he notes the likelihood that the key figures in the Administration's Iraqi policy group were caught up in "groupthink," where they lost their ability to be self-critical. On page 205, he observes that "But by now I had become accustomed to this kind of internal spin and groupthink." A similar reflection occurs on page 291.

Poignant was Condoleezza Rice's alleged nonresponse to his feedback to her on his assignment. This was his attempt to pass on to her the lessons that he saw as a result of his experiences in Iraq.

All in all, another volume on Iraq that helps to provide context; it adds a useful component to the full set of books on Iraq. The title, "Squandered Victory," however, suggests that the American adventure was winnable from the get go. Given the poor after war planning and the inherent religious and cultural fissures in Iraq itself, this is debatable. Nonetheless, a good addition to one's Iraq library. . . .

for more information click here

another expert ignored

In late 2003 Condoleezza Rice telephoned her friend and Stanford colleague Larry Diamond of the Hoover Institution to ask him to go to Iraq as a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Although he had opposed the war with Iraq, after the fact he considered it a "moral imperative" to do everything within our power to establish a democracy there. As an expert in democratic development around the world, both as a scholar and an adviser-practitioner on the ground, few people are more qualified. He believed the Iraqis truly wanted democracy and were willing to work for it. He clearly has no axe to grind, and no compulsion to justify or condemn. Nor did he think the task was hopeless, at least when he went. He believes our intentions were good, and he is eager to give credit to the CPA and Iraqis where it is due.

Diamond spent four months in Baghdad (January to April 2004), and I think it is safe to say that few people worked harder or with more conviction, passion, enthusiasm, and sense of duty than he did. His book went to press in January 2005 right after the election results were announced. While there he focused his efforts on two tasks --he was one of the five drafters of the interim constitution, and he crisscrossed the country (until it became too unsafe to do so) promoting democracy development through speeches, conferences, town hall meetings, print and news media, seminars, and the like.

From the start, though, the Bush plan was a long shot. Imposing a democracy by force is oxymoronic, wherever you might try it. Attempting it in the Middle East, the only place in the world without a single democratic government, decreases your odds of success. The "cardinal sin," in Diamond's mind, was the pre-emptive war in the first place, for this put the United States on a course of "path dependence." A trajectory was set in motion, a chain reaction of events was unleashed, and almost none of it is reversible. A distinguished diplomat likened this to driving down a one-way street in the wrong direction; no matter what turns you make thereafter you are making more wrong turns. That's your best case scenario.

Now compound this with the "staggering failures" that the Bush administration made at "virtually every turn"-- no post-war plan to secure the peace; substantial under-resourcing in troops, equipment, and money; an artificial time table to write a constitution, sell it to the country, and hold elections; interagency turf wars between governmental agencies and especially between the State Department and the Pentagon; disbanding the Iraqi army and de-Baathification that sidelined the only people in Iraq who knew how to rule; grossly underestimating Iraqi nationalism, resentment, disaffection, and suspicions of American motives; making numerous, important decisions in an unapologetically autocratic and undemocratic fashion (a point not lost on Iraqis); a dismissive and flippant contempt for all criticisms; willful and arrogant delusions; wishful thinking and bad information; ostracizing the United Nations; and horrible miscalculations regarding Sistani, Muqtada al-Sadr and Fallujah.

As the violent insurgency engulfed Iraq, Diamond watched much of what he and his CPA colleagues had accomplished unravel. Back in the United States, he decided not to return to Iraq. On April 26, 2004, he wrote his friend of twenty years, Condi Rice, a detailed, confidential memo. He never heard back. He has concluded that the Iraqi fiasco is well on its way to becoming "one of the major overseas blunders in US history." In his sharpest critique in the entire book, Diamond charges the Bush administration with "negligence on a monumental scale." He insists he means this not as a rhetorical flourish or verbal towel-snapping, but in the technical, legal sense of "gross or criminal negligence."

It will be years if not decades before a final verdict on Iraq is in, so predictions are risky. Oddly enough, Diamond still hopes that democracy of some attenuated sort might work in Iraq. For that to happen, three conditions must be met: the play of politics must be inclusive enough to encompass Sunnis and Kurds who feel threatened. Related, a balance of power must insure that no single group dominates the rest. In these first two conditions rests the contradiction between minority rights sought by the Kurds and Sunnis, and majority rule sought by the Shiites. Finally, Iraq's emerging politicians must evidence pragmatic flexibility as opposed to ideological rigidity.

If you read the newspapers, you do not learn much at all new in Diamond's book. What makes it compelling is his unique qualifications and inspirational dedication to the task. At the end of the day, if I was an insurgent who had the least bit of doubt whether my efforts were thwarting America's ill-conceived plans, I would be greatly heartened by this first person narrative of someone who chronicled his personal experiences up close and personal. So far we have been "simply overmatched" for a post-war conflict for which we were "grossly unprepared" (p. 291).

for more information click here

Indispensable

Probably the best book of the year. Diamond writes a great account of the Iraq disaster from an insider's view. Chapter 10, "What Went Wrong," is a devastating indictment of the many mistakes by this incompetent administration, e.g. the disbanding of the Baath party and the army, the insufficient troops and armor. The reader is left to wonder what might have been had the invasion/occupation been run more competently. Perhaps we would be victorious today. Disturbing, but fascinating.

Detailed story of the tragedy of post-war Iraq

Larry Diamond is an internationally recognized expert on the processes, concepts and development of democracies. Thus it made perfect sense for Condoleza Rice to ask him to go into post-war Iraq and assist with the transition of Iraq to a democracy. This book details his experiences in Iraq from which he draws his conclusions about the many errors the United States made in regard to Iraq. The first nine chapters cover his experiences in Iraq. The tenth chapter summarizes the mistakes he thinks were made by the United States. The eleventh and final chapter covers his future predictions as to how Iraq will now evolve and whether democracy is possible under the conditions he observed while serving his nation in Iraq.

There were mistakes made in regard to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. The war itself will probably be seen by future generations as the major mistake made, however management of the occupation was a tragedy. There was a plan to quickly win the war but no plan how to secure the peace and maintain the victory. Neo-conservatives had been lead to believe unrealistic scenarios fabricated by Iraqi expatriates such as Ahmed and Salem Chalabi. The US only provided support to the Oil Ministry building in Baghdad and all other buildings were ransacked. The US War College oddly enough had fully predicted much of the chaos that would occur if insufficient troops were used to secure the victory. A major tragedy was that there were not enough quality supplies and materials available to the US servicemen and women post invasion. It was as if no planning what-so-ever had occurred as to how to secure the victory. The lives of these young men and women who died because the $400,000 canvas-top covered Hummers offered no real protection lies at the feet of Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, the Vice President and the President.

Diamond would point out that the lack of post-war planning prior to the invasion would have to rank as one of the greatest mistakes made, one which had many unintended negative consequences for the Iraqi people and for the image of the United States. The neo-conservatives were dismissive of the UN yet needed the UN to offer the US coverage after the invasion. The British were insistent upon a larger role for the UN since it gave the invasion more legitimacy. The US wanted the UN to cover the US in regard to world opinion but never interfere in the occupational decisions.

Another major mistake documented by Diamond is the disbanding of the entire Iraqi army of 700,000 soldiers as well as disbanding the civil infrastructure of teachers, librarians, college professors, civil servants, etc., al of which numbered around 400,000 persons. Thus the very forces that might help hold the country together were disbanded. Diamond indicates that one negative consequence of disbanding the military is that the borders were no longer secure, which allowed terrorists, spies, and other forces that wished to stimulate insurgency ready access to Iraq. Iran took immediate advantage of this major mistake and began to fill the power vacuum by ensuring that Shiite Iraqis sympathetic to and under Iran's influence received funds, weapons, and support to foster insurgency.

A third major mistake was misunderstanding the cultures of Iraqi's major ethnic and religious groups. Diamond reports that young inexperienced Americans with inability to speak Arabic or with no background knowledge of the region were given vast responsibilities which they carried out in insensitive manners, frequently making matters worse rather than better.

This is especially true in regard to Ayatollah Sistani, the leading religious influence and leader of the Shiites. Sistani had the ability to undermine every US effort and yet he was never engaged in a respectful manner and when he was eventually engaged by the US, much harm in relationships had occurred. This is a critical point because whereas the US wished Iraq to become a democracy with federalist attributes to protect the rights and resources of the Kurds, the Shiites recognized that with 60% of the population they could establish a democracy and yet maintain control of the entire country due to their numbers. Thus the Shiites wished for early elections, quick removal of the US, and then domination of the new government. Sistani was key to slowing down this rush to power which could stimulate a civil war and yet since he was never engaged properly he continued to support elections, starting with elections to determine who would write the new constitution. After months of work writing a new temporary constitution with appointed Iraqis, the Shiites walked out and refused to sign. This could have been avoided had Sistani been included more often in a meaningful way. In addition, whereas Iran has a theocracy where laws are reviewed and approved by religious leaders before enactment, Sistani was more liberal in his interpretation of the role of Islam in a democratic society. He was a potential ally. Whereas there are Shiite factions that receive support, funds, training and information from Iran; Sistani has not lined up with these forces and remains an Iraqi nationalists, resistant to undue influence from Iran. Sistani was also highly suspicious of the US efforts to divest the oil interests into private hands as quickly as possible.

A fourth major mistake was the assumption of the neo-conservatives in the highest leadership positions in the Pentagon that the Iraqis would accept us with open arms as liberators and that the movement toward democracy would be speedy. The fostering of the democratic process requires multiple structural supports and cultural precursors. The neo-conservatives continued to have a negative influence on all decisions made after the invasion. They did this by vetting decisions made by the new Iraqi provisional council through Bremmer. Bremmer would negotiate a deal only to have it undermined by the neo-conservatives in Washington.

Many of these mistakes lead to the two front insurgencies that occurred. The rise of al-Sadr and his Mahdi army was a highly negative force, disrupting much of the southern sections of Iraq where the Shiite majority resides. The Mahdi army created makeshift Sharia courts and tried and executed Iraqis for violation of Islamic law. Entire gypsy villages were destroyed due to the conflict between gypsy culture and Islamic law.

The insurgency has many faces and origins now, resulting from multiple nationalistic, ethnic, cultural, and criminal influences. Unfortunately the unemployment of 700,000 soldiers provided ample manpower for the various factions. In addition, poor control of conventional Iraqi weapons meant they quickly fell into the hands of the insurgency, making life much more risky for US armed forces. Further incompetence lead to US funded weapons for police services also being diverted to the various insurgencies.

Diamond and his colleagues worked hard to educate the people of Iraq about Federalism, a political conception that would allow for the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds to move toward democracy, form a central government, share power and resources, and maintain minority rights. They worked hard to create a transitional government and transitional constitution that would guide the way toward democracy. Yet they lacked resources. Not only did they need hard cars to travel safely around the country, there were insufficient educational and media campaign resources and materials. The democracy education process was vastly under resourced, as were resources needed just for personal safety of US citizens working in Iraq.

Diamond, upon leaving Iraq, writes Condoleza Rice a detailed assessment outlining his fear of the high potential for civil war in Iraq. There were pitfalls in holding elections too soon and pitfalls in holding them too late.

What does the future hold? Diamond pointed out that tremendous resources were being used to build military bases in Iraq. The case seems clear that the US sees that it must be in Iraq for an additional ten to twenty years to ensure a stable Iraq that can counter the force and influence of Iran. These bases help protect and support our four major clients in the region: Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

Diamond suggests that the US consider allowing an agency such as USAID to specialize in post conflict reconstruction. He suggests that Sistani was correct that local elections for mayors should have begun early so as to build the capacity to understand democracy at a local level and then move to regional and then national levels. Diamond's final chapter would indicate that the forces toward democracy are many and sometimes they seem counter-intuitive. Despite the mistakes there is still hope.

for more information click here

reviews: page 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

?Chilling?and often scathing?detail . . . Should be read by anyone interested in understanding why the United States? quick military victory has given way to an increasingly virulent insurgency.??The New York Times
In the fall of 2003, Stanford professor Larry Diamond received a call from Condoleezza Rice, asking if he would spend several months in Baghdad as an adviser to the American occupation authorities. Diamond had not been a supporter of the war in Iraq, but he felt that the task of building a viable democracy was a worthy goal. But when he went to Iraq, his experiences proved to be more of an education than he bargained for.
Squandered Victory is Diamond?s provocative and vivid account of how the American effort to establish democracy in Iraq was hampered not only by insurgents and terrorists but also by a long chain of miscalculations, missed opportunities, and acts of ideological blindness that helped assure that the transition to independence would be neither peaceful nor entirely democratic. And in a new Afterword for the paperback edition, Diamond shows how the ongoing instability in Iraq is a direct result of the shortsighted choices made during the fourteen months of the American occupation and the subsequent Iraqi interim government.

?A forceful and detailed critique of the invasion?s aftermath. . . . A searing indictment.? ?The Wall Street Journal
?Larry Diamond has a flair for making incisive points at the right moment. . . . [Squandered Victory] explodes with the frustrations he felt working for the U.S. occupation.? ?The New Republic

for more information click here

hot