A Great Memior From a Flawed General

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	• Lost Victories Erich von Manstein Presidio Press, 1994 - 574 pages average customer review:based on 45 reviews view larger image
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highly recommended

A Prussian remembers WWII

This book is a little dull for the casual historian, but just the right stuff for those armchair generals and wannebe field marshals. I recommend this book with reservations - do not read his book cover-to-cover, but rather skip around and hit the best parts - there are 3 outstanding sections 1) without a doubt the Sevastopol Crimean campaign was his military masterpiece. This chapter (# 9) reads well and is very interesting. 2) Then touch on the Stalingrad chapter to understand why the German Sixth did not, or could not, break out - some surprising facts are divulged and it is a little deeper and more thoughtful than just blaming it all on Hitler. 3) Then read about his last meeting with Adolf - when he got canned. V. Manstien does not concede it, but that was the luckiest day of his goosestepping life.

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A Memoir on Operational War...

German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein wrote "Lost Victories" in 1955, ten years after the end of the Second World War and eleven years after he had been dismissed from command on the Russian Front by Adolf Hitler.

Von Manstein served in the German Army from 1914 through the First World War, the bitter interwar years, and the major campaigns of the Second World War in Europe. He was, by all accounts, a master of the operational level of war, whether as a commander or as an outstanding staff officer. His memoirs are still in print at least in part because his narrative powers were equal to the task of describing the military operations in the Second World War in which he participated. "Lost Victories" may provide as good an account from the German side of the War in Europe as we are likely to get from a participant. His understanding of the huge battle waged over an immense manuever space in Western Russia is almost as unique as the nature of the fighting itself. If his account is tinged with some "I" and "me", that is perhaps to be forgiven in an autobiography by a man who saw all too clearly the wasted strategic opportunities to conduct a war with a defined and achievable political purpose.

This book is highly recommended to students of the military art and of the Second World War.

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A Great Memior From a Flawed General

Let me first say, that I am one of those who considers Field Marshal Erik von Manstein one of the best operational minds to have fought in the Second World War. His achievment in the post-Stalingrad months (Dec 1942- Feb 1943) will go down as a classic in mobile warefare. Enough has been written about his 1939 operational plan to invade France to fill a volume. In short, he was the consumate military professional.

Which is why it pains me to offer only a 3 rating to his memiors. Don't get me wrong. The memior reads very well; the translation is excellent, and the prose is easy. My main complaint lies with the memior's content. I first read Lost Victories twenty years ago and took most of what Manstein wrote as fact. However, as I read more and more about not only the Wehrmacht, Germany, and Hitler, I began to doubt the narrative that von Manstein and the Feld Herren as a whole have been put to paper. This memior is long on ommisions, and short on introspection. Like other senior officers, Manstein piles the blame on the most senior Wehrmacht leadership while conviently excusing himself. The sad fact remains that von Manstein rarely vocalized any complaints concerning the Nazis treatment of men like Fritsch or Bloomberg (his former superiors sacked by Hitler), the introduction of the swatiska on thier uniforms, the establishment of the Waffen SS, or the treatment of Polish civilians, Jew, or captured officers. In his memiors, Manstein does take a few pages to offer his criticisms of Keitel (OKW) and von Braunstisch (OKH), yet not once did he explicitly critique in name the poor tactical generalship of either General Hoepner -the 4th Panzer Army Commander and his immediate commander during the initial stages of Barbarossa, or Field Marshall von Leeb -the overall commander of the Northern Army Group. This I thought was rather odd considering that these 2 men at that stage of the war still excercised complete freedom of movement. Manstein vaguely critiques the "High Command" (ie either the OKH or Hitler himself). Like other generals, Manstein leveled his stongest critiques on those that were dead, and thus couldn't defend themselves.

The Chapters covering Stalingrad at the battles along the Don are the most dramatic of the memior. Many do find fault with Manstein's decision not to relieve General Paulus of command of the 6th Army in November-December 1942. This was a period of high drama and emotion, when as most experts believe that the 6th Army could have broken out of Stalingrad. It was also the period of greatest danger when the entire front was collapsing back to Rostov. Manstein's reasons for not relieving Paulus are clear enough -namely he didn't have the authority to do so. The other reason, which he barely skirts around is the fact that the Soviets had nearly a half million men, 3000 guns, and 2000 tanks around Stalingrad. If the 6th Army did breakout, this vast force would be unleashed and the entire Don Bend as well as von Kleists Army Group in the Kuban would have been become a giant tomb for the Germans. Manstein after the war could have offered this terrible but truthful fact to the public, but instead said the sacrifice of the 180,000 men of the 6th Army was never an option. Somehow I do not believe him.

The last area of criticism is leveled at von Manstein's decision to back Zeitzler's (OKH) and Hitler's decision to strike at Kursk. In his memiors, he does say he strongly desired to wait until the Soviets struck first and then offer a counter blow on "the back hand". That is, he wished to conduct another mobile counter attack like he did earlier in March at Kharkov - this time from the Northwest and drive the Soviets offensive forces Southward into the Black Sea. This operation, brilliant in conception and most probably would have had sufficient motorized forces to execute was never considered. Hitler couldn't stomach the idea of giving another inch of territory (Manstein's plans included a planned withdraw initially so he could spring his trap), instead followed Zeitzler's idea of a pincer attack on the Kursk sailent. For some reason, von Manstein allowed himself to initially concur. Again, I find this strange. Manstein never was one to keep quiet when considering other people's failures. OKH's Kursks attack lacked imagination, was totally predictable and lacked any strategic value. On paper it looked like the "safe" plan. Even if it was successfull, Manstein, Zeitzler, Guderian, and most of all Hitler knew the Soviets had sufficient strength to bleed the outnumbered German's white. Manstein's plan, on the other hand, had all of the makings of a classic battle of annihilation, which could have bought Hitler another year, or maybe even a stalemate in the East.Yet, Manstein offered little defense of his plan.

Finally, von Manstein like Guderian, Halder, Kluge, Rundstedt, et als. said he had no prior knowledge of the Final Solution, Russian Slave Labour, and the killing of POWs. He says very little, but does offer up evidence of the Soviet's own crimes while he commanded the 56th Panzer Corps in the Courland. As time goes by, I find this harder and harder to believe.

Overall, the reader will have to judge for himself. Of all the memiors, this one is the best written, and there are many times where one can see Manstein's genius as he discusses in his cool, rational prose the many tactical and strategic problems he faced. He is also very kind when ever he writes about the enlisted soliders who served under him, especially the German NCOs. He was never an "armchair" general. Both as commander of the 38th Infantry Corps, and the 56th Panzer Corps he led from the front, and made his decisions based upon first hand knowledge. It was also heartbreaking to read about the death of his only son in 1943. While Erik von Manstein had many faults, he was anything but the stiff, monocoled Prussian caricture that some in the West like to paint of the Prussians. He was a brilliant yet flawed general. His memiors should be read, but critically so. While reading the memiors it is also good to keep in mind that her served one of the cruelist dictators of the 20th Century.

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Memoirs of what could have been.

I have just completed this book - I found it an exhausting struggle to read. It showed me the value of setting clear goals and placing all your energies into achieving them. Hitler wanted to keep his cake and eat it as well. Hitler loved holding territory as opposed to crushing the enemy armies that would eventually regain their momentum and overrun Berlin.

I enjoyed reading Manstein's view of the 1939 Polish campaign and how he might have fought it if he were a Polish General - he appears a leader without malice.

This is not a book about specific battles from inside the tank or behind the MG42 - this book is from the map table, the teleprinter, the conference room at Berchtesgaden. Whilst I got weary of the words "heavy losses" and what these words actually meant in human suffering - it was obvious that Manstein did lament the loss and waste of his charges.

Lastly, I read recently a proclamation that "D-Day in Normandy was the turning of the tide in WWII" - this phrase is the biggest overstatement I have ever read (said with due respect to the enduring sacrifices made there by many). After reading Lost Victories and experiencing a small portion of what the Russian and German armies went through - with the book finishing in early April 1944 - I came to the conclusion that the German army was "an old man" by the time the western allies landed France in June 1944. The war in western Europe was lost in the skies during the Battle of Britain and the war in Russia was lost at the gates of Moscow!

This book put my understanding of the Continental War in Europe into perspective. Recommended.

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A "must read" WW2 strategy book

It is a "must read" strategy book by the one of the best WW2 German generals. It is not the full memoirs. Still it is a 5 star (great) reading.

reviews: page 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Indispensable for understanding the condition and circumstances of Hitler's war. --Martin Blumenson

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