Finally - an objective analysis of the german forces in Normandy!

books:


	• Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness Niklas Zetterling J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 2000 - 462 pages average customer review:based on 7 reviews view larger image
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highly recommended

Superb reference work

This book fills a hole as a serious and detailed statistical analysis of the German order of battle for the Normandy campaign. It is not intended as potted history of the campaign,and really requires an existing knowledge of this period to be of use. It is going to appeal to the serious military student.
The bulk of the book is taken up with detailed TOE information (if you don't know what TOE stands for - don't buy this book) for all German Divisions, GHQ units,and Artillery in Normandy, which is extremely accurate and impeccably researched.
The earlier chapters attempt to establish a number of interesting new(ish) theories concerning German performance and and losses in the campaign. These are very well supported and are extensively footnoted. Subjects include establishing how grossly inflated battlefield casualties from aircraft were (though the author constantly stresses how crucial airpower was to the allies in a broader sense),how some previous historians have mis-read German sources,resulting in confusion over both the numbers of troops in Normandy and the casualties recieved by them there. These chapters could indeed form the basis for an entire new book, Though I suspect, given the authors attention to detail, we might still be waiting for it. Some of the information here might be unpalatable to dyed-in-the wool adherents of Allied superiority, though the author backs all this up with facts and (at times possibly selective) statistics rather than the vague assertions found in many English language works. The chapter on German combat effectiveness really requires previous familiarity with T.N.Dupuy's work. This is not a one-stop book for the Normandy campaign and it was never intended as such. For narrative information you need to look elsewhere to the thousands of other books on the subject.

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Will Appeal to the Serious Student

This is an excellent, albeit esoteric, treatise on German ground forces opposing the Allied campaign in Normandy. It covers the period June 6 through August 22, 1944. Geographically it covers the area delineated by the base of the Brittany peninsula, the Loire River, the line Tours - Vendome - Nogent le Routrou - l'Aigle - Lisieux, and the English Channel. This was the scene of widespread desperate combat that ultimately broke the back of organized German resistance in France. It is steeped in detail about the German forces -- not only their composition, but their status, capabilities, time on the battlefield, losses, and movements. It presumes some prior knowledge of the campaign and the forces involved. Much of it confirms conventional wisdom, but it is not without controversy. For example, Zetterling strongly challenges the view that the Germans had numerical superiority and that it was only the inherent superiority of the Allied soldier and his massive weight of materiel that led to Allied victory. He presents compelling evidence that in fact it was the Allies that had numerical superiority, in men, planes, tanks, artillery tubes, and so forth.
His order of battle information is amazing. He includes non-divisional formations (including corps and army-level units) and an incredible amount of information on tank strength and losses for each unit, by type of tank. The book also contains a excellent collection of photographs, tables, and organization charts. If you're a wargamer or just into OB type of stuff, or just like a lot of detail on a pivotal World War II campaign, this book has it. (You should also see his Kursk 1943 ~ A Statistical Analysis, written with Anders Frankson; Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.)

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Finally - an objective analysis of the german forces in Normandy!

First of all, what this book is not; it is not a campaign history and of course you will not find here, first-person accounts, etc. The book is divided into 3 parts:

# Campaign analysis(german terminology, unit organization, number of soldiers employed, air power, tanks, losses, combat efficiency, unit movements)

#German combat formations - (general headquarters artillery formations, misc gen. headquarters formations, infantry divisions, armoured divisions)

# Appendices - with many further excellent discussions such as:
tooth-to-tail ratios, allied armour strenght, calculations on armour-piercing capabilities, comments on other books, etc.

Not many historians who write about world war II are objective, specially since most of them are either american or british. To add insult to injury, most of them are simply sloppy. They should spend more time at the archives instead of just copying from each other. Mr.Zetterling is the real thing and he collects for this book a tremendous amount of raw data and it is also carefully annotated. The notes themselves are excellent and very informative.
Many readers might me surprised to find out that german casualties in Normandy were in fact only a fraction of what one usually finds in most books. I was not because i had had a chance to look at some of the german reports. KIA + WIA are usually given as 240,000(based on inflated allied estimates) and in sir Keegan's "6 armies.." even "a quarter of a million dead"(where did he get that from???)!!! I own a copy of this garbage and I was shocked when I reached keegan's ridiculous conclusion chapter. The obvious thing is that when you write about a certain campaign and want to know about casualties you pay a visit to the archives of the participants, INCLUDING THE ENEMIE'S! This is what mr.Zetterling does here.

I totally disagree with the other reviewer(mr.Forczyk) when he says "The chapter on German combat efficiency is weird and worthless, beginning by using chunks of Stephen Ambrose' s D-Day as a whipping boy." I think it is excellent, it is supported by the evidence and the author is not the only one(far from it) who advances the chapter's conclusion. Also the criticism of Ambrose, Brown and others is entirely justified and they are deservedly debunked. I understandt however, that american readers might hate seeing their flag-waving and biased champions beign spanked a little bit in the book's pages.

For me, the only topic in the book i would call 'revisionist' is the one on air-power. It is very thought provoking and it could very well be a correct assertion. The author however, says that more detailed study on this has to be done. It is possible that allied air supremacy was much more decisive indirectly(troop movement delays, etc) than directly(casualties, destroyed armour,etc). Reading the excellent "Sledgehammers" one finds out for instance that the germans lost 60 Tiger tanks to direct or indirect fire in Normandy and 13 to air attacks. This goes in the direction of supporting mr.Zetterling's contention.

The second part of the book, deals with the many german formations that saw action at Normandy. It is very good but i would have liked more details.

A nit-pick: as noted by other reviwers the book does not contain an index and that sucks.

In conclusion, i'd say that in spite of a few shortcomings and a steep price, this book is a gem and should be on the shelves of any serious student of the campaing.

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Too Many Ingredients Ruined the Stew!

Niklas Zetterling's _Normandy 1944: ..._ prompts this reviewer to ponder an unanswered question: who should accept the lion's share of the blame for a poorly organized finished product: the author, or the publisher? Zetterling had several irons in the fire with this work. It appears some professional guidance would have been in order to keep the author focused to pursue one goal for one book, not many.In Part 1: "Campaign Analysis" (pp. 1-113), Zetterling presents a competent scholarly study of German combat efficiency during the Normandy Campaign. The author introduces several contentions: the effects of Allied Air power were more of a nuisance to German movements and decision making, rather than destructive; German casualty figures were grossly inflated in Allied participant memoirs, and by western historians; the Allied forces did not enjoy numerical superiority over the Germans, as previously thought; and, collectively, the German units deployed in Normandy performed better than their Allied adversaries. Zetterling stresses throughout that gleaning data from surviving German archival material only (a practice most historians do not do), supports his conclusions. Along the way, Zetterling argues, more accurately, broadsides the works of other historians, most notably: Stephen Ambrose and Peter R. Mansoor. Zetterling tends to digress into other campaigns such as The Battle of the Bulge, and those on the Russian Front. This is more than comparative in nature, to the point where one almost forgets this is supposed to be a book about Normandy. Still, with some polishing, this first part could have emerged as a book length publication, or at least a good series of scholarly articles.In Part 2. "German Combat Formations" (pp. 117-392), the author presents an order of battle reference of German combat units in Normandy. Zetterling focuses mostly on artillery, infantry, and armor formations, but also includes miscellaneous units such as: airborne and Luftwaffe field divisions. Zetterling presents organization and movement information, but little else.The research extends down to battalion level in most cases, to the exclusion of details relating to higher headquarters such as Army and Corps. I was disappointed to find nothing more than mere mention of the German LXXXIV Armee Korps, a headquarters I am particularly interested in. Zetterling's data is extensive, but suffers the same maladies as other order of battle studies. Like Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr.'s _Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II_ (1985), there is no combat narrative. A brief overview for each unit's time in action, on the model of Shelby L. Stanton's _Order of Battle U.S. Army World War II_ (1984) would have been a nice touch. Again, Part 2 could have been a separate reference work. W.J.K. Davies' old standard _German Army Handbook 1939-1945_ ( 1973) is much more user-friendly, however.The third part of the book contains Appendices containing data, sometimes repeated, that could have been put to better use elsewhere. The full-length rebuttal to Trevor Dupuy's thesis by the historian Christopher A. Lawrence belongs in a scholarly journal, not here. The book is a nice package, printed on thick, high quality glossy paper. Many never before seen photos are sprinkled throughout, but as R.A. Forczyk (Amazon reviewer) has noted, the work contains neither an index, nor maps. Normandy 1944 should be a lesson to writers contemplating whether to write a polemic, or a reference work. When too many ingredients are thrown in the broth, an unsavory stew results. This is one book I would check out of the library before purchasing it.

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Masterpiece and must read for studies on German army

This book is well-researched and excellent and let us know deeply what German formation and their strength(manpower, gun and armored vehicles)in Normandy. It is much better than some other book vague description of battle of Normandy because all is based upon German document and facts by figures. I hope the author will write some other topic in this format eg. Barbarossa 1941 or Byelroussia 1944 or Salerno landing 1943.

reviews: page 1, 2

At last, a single-source reference book which accurately details the German field forces employed in Normandy in 1944 and their losses. Chapters include: German Combat Organization (overview); Number of Soldiers Employed; Effects of Allied Air Power; German Armor in Normandy; German Losses in Normandy; Combat Efficiency; and, Unit Movements. In addition, there is a capsule history of every major formation employed in Normandy: infantry and Panzer divisions and separate formations; artillery and Werfer (rocket) units; corps and field-army formations and miscellaneous elements which could bring combat power to bear. Dr. Zetterling provides a sobering analysis of the subject matter and debunks a number of popular myths concerning the campaign (the effectiveness of Allied air power; the preferential treatment of Waffen-SS formations in comparison to their army counterparts; etc.). He supports his text with exhaustive footnoting and provides an organizational chart for most of the formations covered in the book. Includes numerous organizational diagrams, charts, tables and graphs.

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