I worked at McAir during the period covered by this book. I watched about 6,000 hard-working engineers and technicians get laid off in a single week, and I had to do the work of three peoople after those layoffs, so yes, I'm pretty bitter about the whole thing. But anyone who pays taxes ought to be bitter about the totally irresponsible (and yes, illegal) way the program was conceived, awarded, managed, and terminated.
My only complaint is that the book covers only the top-level decision-making. You won't find any "lessons learned" on program management or personal stories of the fraud, waste, and abuse that went on. Oh, yes, in spite of assertions to the contrary, McDonnell and GD BOTH cooked the books and overspent WILDLY on travel, overtime, and facilities (although the description of GD's Building 500 [page 196] is a nice appetizer for the KIND of waste that I saw SO VERY MUCH of.) Still, this is the first time the story has been brought to the attention of the general public, and it's one that is more relevant than ever today. "Black" programs make up increasingly large percentages of the defense budget and it is nearly impossible for Congress to see just exactly what is being done with that money. Highly recommended reading.
With access to a wealth of government and contractor documents and more than a hundred players at all levels of involvement, James Stevenson takes readers into the once-forbidden world of "special access" programs to examine the demise of the A-12, charging that the documents exposed fraudulent and even illegal activity. He faults the navy not just for mismanagement but for ignoring the statutes and regulations that require Congress to appropriate money before entering into contracts. Rather than a single big mistake, he finds the A-12's path from honor to derision to be littered with hundreds of mistakes and attempts to right wrongs or cover them up. In recounting the events that eventually led to the Stealth bomber's cancellation, Stevenson cites countless examples of the mismatch between perception and reality experienced by navy program managers, the defense department, Congress, and the contractors. In the process of telling the story, he takes on the entire defense acquisition process and its responsibility for the program that cost American taxpayers over $5 billion yet produced not a single airplane for their defense.