One of the few comprehensive looks at this important battle

books:


	• Monmouth Courthouse 1778: The Last Great Battle In The North (Campaign) Brendan Morrissey Osprey Publishing, 2004 - 96 pages average customer review:based on 4 reviews view larger image
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Was Charles Lee Unfairly Relieved of Command? Who Cares!

Brendan Morrissey's Monmouth Courthouse 1781 is his fourth addition to the Osprey Campaign series on the American War of Independence. Morrissey has a decent grasp of his subject and he has honed his narrative style in each succeeding volume. However, Morrissey's coverage of the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse suffers from two inter-related problems: an over-focus on the question of American Major General Charles Lee's role in the battle and an ambiguous battle narrative. Essentially, much of this volume revolves around the question - was Charles Lee unfairly relieved of command - rather than a true analysis of the battle itself.

Morrisey's introduction and campaign chronology starts out decently, but starts to thin out in the section on opposing commanders, which only covers well-known figures such as Clinton, Cornwallis, Lee and Washington. What about some of the brigade commanders? The section on opposing armies is also decent, highlighting the introduction of brigades and light infantry in the increasingly professional American army. Oddly, there is no section on opposing plans. Morrissey provides five 2-D Maps: North America in January 1778; New England and the Mid-Atlantic colonies; action at Barren Hill 20 May 1778; Two roads to Monmouth; Monmouth Battlefield. Unfortunately, the map of the Barren Hill skirmish adds nothing to the campaign narrative, and this volume is sorely lacking a decent 2-D map zoomed in to the actual battlefield area at Monmouth. After recently visiting the Monmouth battlefield, I found the maps in this volume were not very useful for someone standing on the actual terrain. The three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps are: Lee's advance; Lee's Retreat; and Clinton's withdrawal. The three color battle scenes by Adam Hook are: the capture of Lieutenant Colonel Ramsay; the 42nd Foot in the Sutfin Orchard; the guns on Comb's Hill.

Morrissey' campaign narrative meanders through a variety of disparate events in early 1778 until he finally moves into the British withdrawal from Philadelphia that initiated the sequence of events that culminated at Monmouth Courthouse. It is apparent that Washington's pursuit of the withdrawing British army was hardly rapid, even a bit sluggish (Washington had lost most of one field army in 1776 and was probably reticent to risk his main army unless sure of the outcome). However, the Americans were able to catch up with the British army near Freehold, New Jersey on 27 June 1778. After much debate, Washington gave the mission of attacking the British rearguard to Charles Lee. According to most accounts, Lee botched the attack in a half-hearted effort and was relieved by Washington, who was able to turn the battle into a draw. In Morrissey's version of the battle, Lee was unfairly relieved.

I think Morrissey has stuck his neck out pretty far in attempting to defend Charles Lee and to base his assessment of the battle in terms of whether or not the America advance guard commander was unfairly relieved. First, what did Charles Lee ever really do for the Patriot cause? At Charleston, he provided advice that the locals didn't need. In the 1776 New York campaign, he managed to disobey orders and then get himself captured, probably collaborating with his British hosts. Morrissey suggests that Lee was court-martialed after the battle due to Washington's "popularity," which ridiculously equates the man who almost single-handedly welding together America's war effort in the Revolution to some modern-day celebrity. Morrissey claims that Lee was neither disrespectful nor treacherous, but merely undone by adverse circumstances and unruly subordinates. This is hogwash. Washington was not a capricious sort of commander who acted on whimsy; historians should give him the benefit of the doubt that the reasons were justified. What would Morrissey have us believe - that Washington acted out of rage or petty jealousy?

It is also difficult to evaluate how well (or badly) Lee performed his mission of attacking the British rearguard given Morrissey's hard-to-follow tactical narrative. Morrissey writes: "[Lee] ordered Grayson to proceed with caution, he sent Jackson to join him at the front of the column and asked Wayne to take charge of those two detachments and a third unit (taken from Scott's command) under fellow Pennsylvanian Colonel Richard Butler." Huh? I can't tell who is doing what here. The American command structure of the advance guard was jumbled, with a variety of units provided detachments of their best troops, but Morrissey lumps them into a potpourri of poorly-identified names, with little attempt to distinguish the size or relationship of these detachments. Morrissey claims that the terrain and the sudden re-appearance of the British rearguard frustrated Lee's efforts to mount a coherent attack. I think the more likely reasons for Lee's discomfiture were simply military incompetence and poor leadership skills. When the Revolution started, Lee was one of several foreign officers who impressed Congress with his resume and secured a commission, but close examination of his record indicates that his command experience at high level was negligible. It is interesting that both Charles Lee and Horatio Gates, who had been majors in the British army, performed poorly on the battlefield and were poor leaders of men. When Lee botched a straightforward attack and let his picked troops rout, it was too much for Washington. Most of all, Morrissey's over-focus on Lee misses much of the significance of the first battle involving von-Steuben-trained American continentals and British regulars. One of Washington's goals was to test the efficiency of these new troops and it must have been galling to see them running away with hardly a fight. As every officer knows, a commander is responsible for everything his troops do or fail to do, and Lee was thus responsible for not only failing his mission, but allowing a disgraceful rout to occur after only minor skirmishes.

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One of the few comprehensive looks at this important battle

Throughout my education (even into college), any study of the American Revolution usually started at Boston, talked about the Declaration of Independence, and then skipped over to Yorktown. Trenton, Saratoga, and Valley Forge were some times thrown in for good measure, however none were ever covered in great detail.

Most of the major battles of the war have largely been ignored, such as New York, Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth, Charleston or Camden. This is likely because they all tended to be complex actions and resulted in either an American loss or at very least a draw. Monmouth was one of the largest battles of the American Revolution and was the last major battle fought by Washington's Main Army until Yorktown, yet to date the best book on the subject was William Stryker's "Battle of Monmouth", which was written at end of the 19th century and time has exposed several flaws.

This book does an excellent job of translating this complicated battle, with all of its various stages and political drama, into a narrative of how the stage was set, how the battle unfolded, and what aftermath resulted. Starting in Philadelphia and Valley Forge, the author traces the progress of the two armies across New Jersey and their engagement outside of Monmouth Courthouse. This battle had several stages, which is skillfully articulated and supplemented by full color maps showing the action and how it developed.

The author is extremely sympathetic to Charles Lee, which is a point I may disagree with. While Lee may have executed the letter of Washington's orders, he certainly did not execute their spirit. Coupled with his past behavior and track record (being captured in a New Jersey tavern away from his troops, politically challenging Washington with Congress, etc.), I think Lee exhausted any benefit of the doubt by the time of Monmouth.

All in all, this book is long over due, and hopefully the author will repeat this success by covering covering the Philadelphia Campaign, Camden, etc.

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Interesting Pro-British Account of Battle

I have always regarded the Ospery titles as a mixed-bag. The uniform books in the past were pricy items with a few color prints and other assorted details often not amounting to more than 30 pages or so. Now we have the Campaigns and Battles series which has expanded on the historical aspects, but still at under 90 pages they often cut short the information. Over all the series has grown and gott'en better, but it is still pricy for what you get. The main asset to the series is that it often covers esoteric subjects.

Monmouth was one of the largest battles of the American Revolution, and the last major encounter in the Northern theater of the war. There has yet to be a recent comprehensive book done on this very complicated, and confusing battle. Perhaps this is the reason why. There have been numerous magazine articles over the years concerning it, several done by Civil War historians who are kind of out of their league in this earlier period. The controversy of Charles Lee has also always sparked interst.

In this Ospery Title Mr. Morissy presents a decidedly British perspective on the battle. This is rather refreshing because the American Revolution tends to be riddled with much mythology and legend. Monmouth is no exception in this regard. American readers accustomed to the Spirit of '76 approach by most American historians might be somewhat put off by this work. One of the reviwers above seems to be such an example. Still, this book gives us some much needed perspective of what was passing on the other side of the hill.

Details about the British plans and route of march from Philadelphia to New York in the Summer of 1778 were fascinating. I have yet to find this information in any other works on the subject. Most are more concerned with Washington's impending confrontation with Charles Lee, and the supposed greatness of Steuben's training of the Continental army. Here the author gives us some needed perspective on these events. Contrary to most popular views, the Continental infantry did not wisk the British off the field with their new found training under Stueben. As is pointed out here, it was the American artillery that showed the most improvement during the battle. The use and employment of Knox's batteries restricted Clinton's options of launching further assaults on Washy's lines on at least one occasion. Still, this fire was not as deadly as most popular views would have it. The famous example of a file of British Grenadiers having their muskets shattered by a single solid shot seems mostly apocryphal. Molly Pitcher and much of Washy's tirade toward Charles Lee probably falls into this category as well. Legends and myths propagated by American historians who tend to be great story tellers, but are less strong at discerning facts from fiction!

That said Mr. Morrissy has some short-comings as well. The maps in this title are not that clear. They have too much information and not enough clearity. I was on the battlefield recently and I did not find the maps contained within to be all that helpful. The account of the battle is a bit messy as well. Perhaps this can't be helped because Lee had such a hodge-podge of units under his command. The color plates are nice, but selective of detail. The brief bios of the major leaders contained interesting notes, but mostly generasl information easily available elsewhere. Descriptions of the British army organization and tactics was decidedly more detailed than on the American army. The militia were hardly discussed at all.

I didn't find that the author went into Lee's conduct excessively, as at least one reviewer above seems to think. Let's face it, Washy was not a very good battlefield commander. His command control was poor at almost all the major battles he fought. Monmouth was no exception. Washy was good as an inspirational leader, poor as a tactician. Of course this will no doubt be considered heresy by many historians out there, but I think we have to take Washy off his great white horse sometimes. Charles Lee had a self-made reputation, which proved not to be very much when he was finally faced with a real crunch. His poor social skills didn't help matters either! That said I would agree with Mr. Morissy that the mishap that befell the American advance-guard was not totally of his making. Mixed units, and strong-headed subordinates like Wayne and Lafayette were prone to make matters worse. That the American advance-guard didn't get crushed was due more to luck, and the innate ability of Americans to run away well in marshes! Clinton should have recalled the Battle of Brooklyn in that regard. Americans got away through the marshes there as well! Same at Monmouth.

Washy deserves credit for stopping the retreat and forming a decent line against the British. After that it was relatively easy to deflect several of Clinton's rather half-hearted attacks. Washy responded in kind later in the day. None of this really provided much of an opportunity for the famed Stueben drill to astonish the British. But the artillery did make a good showing of itself. Casualties remain another legend of this battle. Both sides upped the other sides' and lowered their own. The tendency of late has been to say that both lost more than has generally been acknowledged. This means the British did not take staggering losses at Monmouth, the Steuben drill did not astonish them, Molly Pitcher did not save the day, and Washy probably didn't curse until the leaves on the trees shock at Lee's retreat! Both sides can look at the battle as victory in their own terms. Which makes it a draw if nothing else. For the British Clinton managed to exicute a very difficult march in the face of considerable adverse circumstances. He even gave Washy a bit of his own bit with using the camp fires to deceive him about his withdrawal after the battle. Clinton was probably the best over all stratigist and tactican of the war. That does not say very much considering the others out there!

Like most Ospery titles this account is brief, but provides some interesting perspectives. It gives a much needed British view, as well as new details about the Americans. Until a full length history is done on the battle, this Ospery title is likely to be the best on the subject. The book fills an important niche and provides some new information on a topic often lauded with much myth and legend. Much of our perspective of the American Revolution suffers from this problem. We need to have a more detached view in order to seperate fiction from fact. Brian Morissy shows us that our history when seen through others eyes can have a much different look. American historions need to realize this when they write their stories about our history.

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The battle of Monmouth Courthouse was not only the last major action in the Northern theater, it was also the longest and hardest-fought engagement of the entire Revolutionary War. When the British abandoned Philadelphia to return to New York City, American troops harassed their retreat. On the morning of 28 June 1778, General Lee, George Washington?s lieutenant, attacked the British rearguard but his attack went badly wrong. The British rearguard, now reinforced, threw Lee?s troops into a headlong retreat. Lee was relieved of his command and Washington?s Continentals then stood toe-to-toe with the British, bloodily repulsing a series of powerful attacks by crack troops.

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